[Chapter-delegates] TikTok and related US actions

Fri Aug 7 08:53:39 PDT 2020

Congratulations Slovenia. Your leadership is working for you!

I do believe that because of the power that access provides, some amount of
control may be necessary.

This is not dissimilar to my view that since some countries have different
core values on the treatment of COVID19 resulting in higher numbers than is
tolerable for our small island state, then travel from their states should
be banned until the risk is removed.

Do you believe that this is a balanced view?

Andrea Livingston-Prince

On Fri, Aug 7, 2020, 08:54 Borka Jerman Blazic via Chapter-delegates <
chapter-delegates at elists.isoc.org> wrote:

>
> Hi,
>
> Here, from Ljubljana, Slovenia is not possible to open the  White house
> URLs from the enclosed mail. I assume (but I am not 100% sure)  that
> Slovenia is not yet placed on
>
> the list of "30 trusted countries" because the memorandum "for secure
> communications" will be signed next Thursday during the visit of the state
> secretary M.Pompeo to Slovenia, who is on
>
>  a trip to several European countries (including Austria, Poland, Romania
> and  few others) with the same mission (signing the memorandum and
> accepting the new policy for electronic communications - Internet).  The
> list of countries is very apparent, as the  list of signatories most
> possibly will be then used for convincing the other European countries that
> may have some concern.
>
> This a good example how internet will function in the future, the access
> to information will be restricted in and out the closed circle of "trusted
> countries". To become "trusted country" you will need to accept the new US
> policy for electronic communication. This remind me to the COCOM era and
> the use of cryptography war.
>
> Is this policy acceptable for ISOC ("Internet is for everyone"?
>
>
> Borka
>
> Richard Hill via Chapter-delegates je 7. 08. 2020 ob 13:54 napisal:
> > I wonder whether ISOC should take a position regarding actions that >
> the US is taking, or proposing to take, regarding the use of Chinese > ICT
> products and services. > > I presume that everybody on this list is aware
> of US President > Trump's intention of banning TikTok, or at least forcing
> its US > operations to be sold to a US company. Here is the actual
> Executive > Order (and a corresponding order regarding WeChat): > > >
> https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-t
> > > hreat-posed-tiktok/
> > > >
> https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-t
> > > hreat-posed-wechat/
> > > The rationale for the TikTok Order includes the following: > > "TikTok
> automatically captures vast swaths of information from its > users,
> including Internet and other network activity information such > as
> location data and browsing and search histories. This data > collection
> threatens to allow the Chinese Communist Party access to > Americans'
> personal and proprietary information - potentially > allowing China to
> track the locations of Federal employees and > contractors, build dossiers
> of personal information for blackmail, > and conduct corporate espionage."
> > > "TikTok also reportedly censors content that the Chinese Communist >
> Party deems politically sensitive, such as content concerning > protests in
> Hong Kong and China's treatment of Uyghurs and other > Muslim minorities.
> This mobile application may also be used for > disinformation campaigns
> that benefit the Chinese Communist Party, > such as when TikTok videos
> spread debunked conspiracy theories about > the origins of the 2019 Novel
> Coronavirus." > > The first paragraph is about data collection. It appears
> to me that > banning the application outright is a disproportionate
> measure. It > would have sufficed to ban the undesirable data collection. >
> > The second paragraph is about censorship and disinformation. Banning >
> the application does not reduce censorship. Again, it appears to me > that
> the outright ban is disproportionate. It would have sufficed to > ban the
> censorship and disinformation. > > Separately, it seems to me that
> analogous arguments can be made for > Facebook and Twitter. For example: >
> > "Facebook automatically captures vast swaths of information from its >
> users, including Internet and other network activity information such > as
> location data and browsing and search histories. This data > collection
> threatens to allow the US government to access the > personal and
> proprietary information of US persons under warrant and > non-US persons
> without individual warrants - potentially allowing the > US government to
> track the locations of employees of contractors of > other governments,
> build dossiers of personal information for > blackmail, and conduct
> espionage." > > "Facebook also reportedly censors content that the Facebook
> deems > unacceptable, such as hate speech, incitement to violence, nudity,
> > etc. Facebook may also be used for disinformation campaigns that >
> benefit political parties, such as when Facebook was used to spread >
> incorrect information on political issues and the 2019 Novel >
> Coronavirus." > > Should ISOC take a position on these issues? Should other
> states > follow the path opened by the US and proceed to ban Facebook, >
> Twitter, etc? > > Doesn't the US position invalidate the proposals it has
> put forth in > WTO and free trade agreements regarding free flow of data? >
> > More importantly, the TikTok ban is just one step of an announced US >
> campaign to curtail the use of Chinese ICT products and services. I >
> reproduce below statements from the US Department of State. > > Again,
> should ISOC take a position on this matter? Should states > choose camps
> and decide to exclude ICTs developed or provided by > vendors in other
> countries? In this context, note that US-made > hardware has been known to
> contain undocumented backdoors: > > >
> https://www.tomshardware.com/news/cisco-backdoor-hardcoded-accounts-software
> > > ,37480.html
> >
> https://www.csoonline.com/article/2136221/cisco-confirms-undocumented-backdo
> > > or.html
> >
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-
> > > sa-20180328-xesc
> >
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-
> > > sa-20180307-cpcp
> >
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-
> > > sa-20180516-dnac
> >
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-
> > > sa-20180606-waas-snmp
> >
> https://blog.rapid7.com/2015/12/20/cve-2015-7755-juniper-screenos-authentica
> > > tion-backdoor/
> > > Again, doesn't the US position invalidate the proposals it has put >
> forth in WTO and free trade agreements regarding ICT products and >
> services? > > Best, Richard > > ========== > > Press release at: > >
> https://www.state.gov/announcing-the-expansion-of-the-clean-network-to-safeg
> > > uard-americas-assets/
> > > The Clean Network program is the Trump Administration's >
> comprehensive approach to guarding our citizens' privacy and our >
> companies' most sensitive information from aggressive intrusions by >
> malign actors, such as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Today, I am >
> announcing the launch of five new lines of effort to protect > America's
> critical telecommunications and technology infrastructure. > > These
> programs are rooted in internationally accepted digital trust > standards
> and built upon the 5G Clean Path initiative, announced on > April 29, 2020,
> to secure data traveling on 5G networks into U.S. > diplomatic facilities
> overseas and within the United States. > > The five new lines of effort for
> the Clean Network are as follows: > > * Clean Carrier: To ensure untrusted
> People's Republic of China > (PRC) carriers are not connected with U.S.
> telecommunications > networks. Such companies pose a danger to U.S.
> national security and > should not provide international telecommunications
> services to and > from the United States. > > * Clean Store: To remove
> untrusted applications from U.S. mobile > app stores. PRC apps threaten our
> privacy, proliferate viruses, and > spread propaganda and disinformation.
> American's most sensitive > personal and business information must be
> protected on their mobile > phones from exploitation and theft for the
> CCP's benefit. > > * Clean Apps: To prevent untrusted PRC smartphone
> manufacturers > from pre-installing -or otherwise making available for
> download - > trusted apps on their apps store. Huawei, an arm of the PRC >
> surveillance state, is trading on the innovations and reputations of >
> leading U.S. and foreign companies. These companies should remove > their
> apps from Huawei's app store to ensure they are not partnering > with a
> human rights abuser. > > * Clean Cloud: To prevent U.S. citizens' most
> sensitive personal > information and our businesses' most valuable
> intellectual property, > including COVID-19 vaccine research, from being
> stored and processed > on cloud-based systems accessible to our foreign
> adversaries through > companies such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent. > > *
> Clean Cable: To ensure the undersea cables connecting our > country to the
> global internet are not subverted for intelligence > gathering by the PRC
> at hyper scale. We will also work with foreign > partners to ensure that
> undersea cables around the world aren't > similarly subject to compromise.
> > > Momentum for the Clean Network program is growing. More than thirty >
> countries and territories are now Clean Countries, and many of the >
> world's biggest telecommunications companies are Clean Telcos. All > have
> committed to exclusively using trusted vendors in their Clean > Networks. >
> > The United States calls on our allies and partners in government and >
> industry around the world to join the growing tide to secure our data >
> from the CCP's surveillance state and other malign entities. Building > a
> Clean fortress around our citizens' data will ensure all of our > nations'
> security. > > > =========== > > Remarks by US Secretary of State Pompeo,
> at: > >
> https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-10/
> > > > > In April, I announced our team's Clean Path initiative to keep
> Americans'
> > data safe from untrusted vendors. Today, I'm pleased to announce the >
> expansion of the Clean Network with the launch of five new lines of >
> effort. I'll walk through them quickly. > > First, Clean Carrier. We are
> working to ensure that untrusted > Chinese telecom companies don't provide
> international > telecommunications services between the United States and
> foreign > destinations. > > I join Attorney General Barr, Secretary Esper,
> and Acting Secretary > Wolf in urging the FCC to revoke and terminate the
> authorizations of > China Telecom and three other companies providing
> services to and > from the United States. > > Second, we call Clean Store.
> We want to see untrusted Chinese apps > removed from U.S. app stores.
> President Trump has mentioned impending > action on TikTok, and for good
> reason. With parent companies based in > China, apps like TikTok, WeChat,
> and others are significant threats > to the personal data of American
> citizens, not to mention tools for > CCP [Chinese Communist Party] content
> censorship. > > Third, Clean Apps. We're working to prevent Huawei and
> other > untrusted vendors from pre-installing or making available for >
> download the most popular U.S. apps. We don't want companies to be >
> complicit in Huawei's human rights abuses or the CCP's surveillance >
> apparatus. > > Fourth, Clean Cloud. We're protecting Americans' most
> sensitive > personal information and our businesses' most valuable
> intellectual > property - including COVID vaccine research - from being
> accessed on > cloud-based systems run by companies such as Alibaba, Baidu,
> China > Mobile, China Telecom, and Tencent. > > The State Department will
> work closely with Commerce and other > agencies to limit the ability of
> Chinese cloud service providers to > collect, to store, and to process vast
> amounts of data and sensitive > information here in the United States. > >
> Fifth and finally, Clean Cable. We're working to ensure that the CCP >
> can't compromise information carried by the undersea cables that > connect
> our country and others to the global internet. > > Huawei Marine
> significantly underbids other companies on multiple > procurements to
> connect Asia, the Pacific, Africa, and Europe using > Chinese state-backed
> underseas technology. > > We can't allow that to continue. We call on all
> freedom-loving > nations and companies to join the Clean Network. > >
> _______________________________________________ As an Internet > Society
> Chapter Officer you are automatically subscribed to this > list, which is
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> https://admin.internetsociety.org/622619/User/Login View the Internet >
> Society Code of Conduct: >
> https://www.internetsociety.org/become-a-member/code-of-conduct/
>
> --
> Prof.dr.Borka Jerman-Blažič Ex-Head, Laboratory for Open systems and
> Networks Jožef Stefan Institute and Faculty of Economics, Ljubljana
> University Slovenia tel. +386 1 477 3408 tel. +386 1 477 3756 mob. +386 41
> 678 410
>
> _______________________________________________
> As an Internet Society Chapter Officer you are automatically subscribed
> to this list, which is regularly synchronized with the Internet Society
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>
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