[Chapter-delegates] TikTok and related US actions

Fri Aug 7 06:54:04 PDT 2020

Hi,

Here, from Ljubljana, Slovenia is not possible to open the  White house  
URLs from the enclosed mail. I assume (but I am not 100% sure)  that 
Slovenia is not yet placed on

the list of "30 trusted countries" because the memorandum "for secure 
communications" will be signed next Thursday during the visit of the 
state secretary M.Pompeo to Slovenia, who is on

  a trip to several European countries (including Austria, Poland, 
Romania and  few others) with the same mission (signing the memorandum 
and accepting the new policy for electronic communications - Internet).  
The list of countries is very apparent, as the  list of signatories most 
possibly will be then used for convincing the other European countries 
that may have some concern.

This a good example how internet will function in the future, the access 
to information will be restricted in and out the closed circle of 
"trusted countries". To become "trusted country" you will need to accept 
the new US policy for electronic communication. This remind me to the 
COCOM era and the use of cryptography war.

Is this policy acceptable for ISOC ("Internet is for everyone"?

Borka

Richard Hill via Chapter-delegates je 7. 08. 2020 ob 13:54 napisal:

> I wonder whether ISOC should take a position regarding actions that  > the US is taking, or proposing to take, regarding the use of Chinese 
 > ICT products and services. > > I presume that everybody on this list 
is aware of US President > Trump's intention of banning TikTok, or at 
least forcing its US > operations to be sold to a US company. Here is 
the actual Executive > Order (and a corresponding order regarding 
WeChat): > > > 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-t 
 > > hreat-posed-tiktok/
>  > > 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-t 
 > > hreat-posed-wechat/
>  > The rationale for the TikTok Order includes the following: > > 
"TikTok automatically captures vast swaths of information from its > 
users, including Internet and other network activity information such > 
as location data and browsing and search histories. This data > 
collection threatens to allow the Chinese Communist Party access to > 
Americans' personal and proprietary information - potentially > allowing 
China to track the locations of Federal employees and > contractors, 
build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, > and conduct 
corporate espionage." > > "TikTok also reportedly censors content that 
the Chinese Communist > Party deems politically sensitive, such as 
content concerning > protests in Hong Kong and China's treatment of 
Uyghurs and other > Muslim minorities. This mobile application may also 
be used for > disinformation campaigns that benefit the Chinese 
Communist Party, > such as when TikTok videos spread debunked conspiracy 
theories about > the origins of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus." > > The 
first paragraph is about data collection. It appears to me that > 
banning the application outright is a disproportionate measure. It > 
would have sufficed to ban the undesirable data collection. > > The 
second paragraph is about censorship and disinformation. Banning > the 
application does not reduce censorship. Again, it appears to me > that 
the outright ban is disproportionate. It would have sufficed to > ban 
the censorship and disinformation. > > Separately, it seems to me that 
analogous arguments can be made for > Facebook and Twitter. For example: 
 > > "Facebook automatically captures vast swaths of information from 
its > users, including Internet and other network activity information 
such > as location data and browsing and search histories. This data > 
collection threatens to allow the US government to access the > personal 
and proprietary information of US persons under warrant and > non-US 
persons without individual warrants - potentially allowing the > US 
government to track the locations of employees of contractors of > other 
governments, build dossiers of personal information for > blackmail, and 
conduct espionage." > > "Facebook also reportedly censors content that 
the Facebook deems > unacceptable, such as hate speech, incitement to 
violence, nudity, > etc. Facebook may also be used for disinformation 
campaigns that > benefit political parties, such as when Facebook was 
used to spread > incorrect information on political issues and the 2019 
Novel > Coronavirus." > > Should ISOC take a position on these issues? 
Should other states > follow the path opened by the US and proceed to 
ban Facebook, > Twitter, etc? > > Doesn't the US position invalidate the 
proposals it has put forth in > WTO and free trade agreements regarding 
free flow of data? > > More importantly, the TikTok ban is just one step 
of an announced US > campaign to curtail the use of Chinese ICT products 
and services. I > reproduce below statements from the US Department of 
State. > > Again, should ISOC take a position on this matter? Should 
states > choose camps and decide to exclude ICTs developed or provided 
by > vendors in other countries? In this context, note that US-made > 
hardware has been known to contain undocumented backdoors: > > > 
https://www.tomshardware.com/news/cisco-backdoor-hardcoded-accounts-software 
 > > ,37480.html
> https://www.csoonline.com/article/2136221/cisco-confirms-undocumented-backdo  > > or.html
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-  > > sa-20180328-xesc
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-  > > sa-20180307-cpcp
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-  > > sa-20180516-dnac
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-  > > sa-20180606-waas-snmp
> https://blog.rapid7.com/2015/12/20/cve-2015-7755-juniper-screenos-authentica  > > tion-backdoor/
>  > Again, doesn't the US position invalidate the proposals it has put > 
forth in WTO and free trade agreements regarding ICT products and > 
services? > > Best, Richard > > ========== > > Press release at: > > 
https://www.state.gov/announcing-the-expansion-of-the-clean-network-to-safeg 
 > > uard-americas-assets/
>  > The Clean Network program is the Trump Administration's > 
comprehensive approach to guarding our citizens' privacy and our > 
companies' most sensitive information from aggressive intrusions by > 
malign actors, such as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Today, I am > 
announcing the launch of five new lines of effort to protect > America's 
critical telecommunications and technology infrastructure. > > These 
programs are rooted in internationally accepted digital trust > 
standards and built upon the 5G Clean Path initiative, announced on > 
April 29, 2020, to secure data traveling on 5G networks into U.S. > 
diplomatic facilities overseas and within the United States. > > The 
five new lines of effort for the Clean Network are as follows: > > * 
Clean Carrier: To ensure untrusted People's Republic of China > (PRC) 
carriers are not connected with U.S. telecommunications > networks. Such 
companies pose a danger to U.S. national security and > should not 
provide international telecommunications services to and > from the 
United States. > > * Clean Store: To remove untrusted applications from 
U.S. mobile > app stores. PRC apps threaten our privacy, proliferate 
viruses, and > spread propaganda and disinformation. American's most 
sensitive > personal and business information must be protected on their 
mobile > phones from exploitation and theft for the CCP's benefit. > > * 
Clean Apps: To prevent untrusted PRC smartphone manufacturers > from 
pre-installing -or otherwise making available for download - > trusted 
apps on their apps store. Huawei, an arm of the PRC > surveillance 
state, is trading on the innovations and reputations of > leading U.S. 
and foreign companies. These companies should remove > their apps from 
Huawei's app store to ensure they are not partnering > with a human 
rights abuser. > > * Clean Cloud: To prevent U.S. citizens' most 
sensitive personal > information and our businesses' most valuable 
intellectual property, > including COVID-19 vaccine research, from being 
stored and processed > on cloud-based systems accessible to our foreign 
adversaries through > companies such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent. > > 
* Clean Cable: To ensure the undersea cables connecting our > country to 
the global internet are not subverted for intelligence > gathering by 
the PRC at hyper scale. We will also work with foreign > partners to 
ensure that undersea cables around the world aren't > similarly subject 
to compromise. > > Momentum for the Clean Network program is growing. 
More than thirty > countries and territories are now Clean Countries, 
and many of the > world's biggest telecommunications companies are Clean 
Telcos. All > have committed to exclusively using trusted vendors in 
their Clean > Networks. > > The United States calls on our allies and 
partners in government and > industry around the world to join the 
growing tide to secure our data > from the CCP's surveillance state and 
other malign entities. Building > a Clean fortress around our citizens' 
data will ensure all of our > nations' security. > > > =========== > > 
Remarks by US Secretary of State Pompeo, at: > > 
https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-10/ 
 > > > > In April, I announced our team's Clean Path initiative to keep 
Americans'
> data safe from untrusted vendors. Today, I'm pleased to announce the  > expansion of the Clean Network with the launch of five new lines of > 
effort. I'll walk through them quickly. > > First, Clean Carrier. We are 
working to ensure that untrusted > Chinese telecom companies don't 
provide international > telecommunications services between the United 
States and foreign > destinations. > > I join Attorney General Barr, 
Secretary Esper, and Acting Secretary > Wolf in urging the FCC to revoke 
and terminate the authorizations of > China Telecom and three other 
companies providing services to and > from the United States. > > 
Second, we call Clean Store. We want to see untrusted Chinese apps > 
removed from U.S. app stores. President Trump has mentioned impending > 
action on TikTok, and for good reason. With parent companies based in > 
China, apps like TikTok, WeChat, and others are significant threats > to 
the personal data of American citizens, not to mention tools for > CCP 
[Chinese Communist Party] content censorship. > > Third, Clean Apps. 
We're working to prevent Huawei and other > untrusted vendors from 
pre-installing or making available for > download the most popular U.S. 
apps. We don't want companies to be > complicit in Huawei's human rights 
abuses or the CCP's surveillance > apparatus. > > Fourth, Clean Cloud. 
We're protecting Americans' most sensitive > personal information and 
our businesses' most valuable intellectual > property - including COVID 
vaccine research - from being accessed on > cloud-based systems run by 
companies such as Alibaba, Baidu, China > Mobile, China Telecom, and 
Tencent. > > The State Department will work closely with Commerce and 
other > agencies to limit the ability of Chinese cloud service providers 
to > collect, to store, and to process vast amounts of data and 
sensitive > information here in the United States. > > Fifth and 
finally, Clean Cable. We're working to ensure that the CCP > can't 
compromise information carried by the undersea cables that > connect our 
country and others to the global internet. > > Huawei Marine 
significantly underbids other companies on multiple > procurements to 
connect Asia, the Pacific, Africa, and Europe using > Chinese 
state-backed underseas technology. > > We can't allow that to continue. 
We call on all freedom-loving > nations and companies to join the Clean 
Network. > > _______________________________________________ As an 
Internet > Society Chapter Officer you are automatically subscribed to 
this > list, which is regularly synchronized with the Internet Society > 
Chapter Portal (AMS): > 
https://admin.internetsociety.org/622619/User/Login View the Internet > 
Society Code of Conduct: > 
https://www.internetsociety.org/become-a-member/code-of-conduct/

-- 
Prof.dr.Borka Jerman-Blažič Ex-Head, Laboratory for Open systems and 
Networks Jožef Stefan Institute and Faculty of Economics, Ljubljana 
University Slovenia tel. +386 1 477 3408 tel. +386 1 477 3756 mob. +386 
41 678 410

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <https://elists.isoc.org/mailman/private/chapter-delegates/attachments/20200807/d8a2248d/attachment.htm>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: borka.vcf
Type: text/x-vcard
Size: 4 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <https://elists.isoc.org/mailman/private/chapter-delegates/attachments/20200807/d8a2248d/attachment.vcf>