[Chapter-delegates] TikTok and related US actions

Fri Aug 7 06:33:59 PDT 2020

What do US companies feel if this creates momentum for tit for tat
measures forcing them to sell / give up in
other parts of the world?

C

Richard Hill via Chapter-delegates writes:

> I wonder whether ISOC should take a position regarding actions that the US
> is taking, or proposing to take, regarding the use of Chinese ICT products
> and services.
>
> I presume that everybody on this list is aware of US President Trump's
> intention of banning TikTok, or at least forcing its US operations to be
> sold to a US company.  Here is the actual Executive Order (and a
> corresponding order regarding WeChat):
>
>  
> https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-t
> hreat-posed-tiktok/  
>
>  
> https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-t
> hreat-posed-wechat/  
>
> The rationale for the TikTok Order includes the following:
>
> "TikTok automatically captures vast swaths of information from its users,
> including Internet and other network activity information such as location
> data and browsing and search histories.  This data collection threatens to
> allow the Chinese Communist Party access to Americans' personal and
> proprietary information - potentially allowing China to track the locations
> of Federal employees and contractors, build dossiers of personal information
> for blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage."
>
> "TikTok also reportedly censors content that the Chinese Communist Party
> deems politically sensitive, such as content concerning protests in Hong
> Kong and China's treatment of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities.  This
> mobile application may also be used for disinformation campaigns that
> benefit the Chinese Communist Party, such as when TikTok videos spread
> debunked conspiracy theories about the origins of the 2019 Novel
> Coronavirus."
>
> The first paragraph is about data collection. It appears to me that banning
> the application outright is a disproportionate measure. It would have
> sufficed to ban the undesirable data collection.
>
> The second paragraph is about censorship and disinformation. Banning the
> application does not reduce censorship. Again, it appears to me that the
> outright ban is disproportionate. It would have sufficed to ban the
> censorship and disinformation.
>
> Separately, it seems to me that analogous arguments can be made for Facebook
> and Twitter. For example:
>
> "Facebook automatically captures vast swaths of information from its users,
> including Internet and other network activity information such as location
> data and browsing and search histories.  This data collection threatens to
> allow the US government to access the personal and proprietary information
> of US persons under warrant and non-US persons without individual warrants -
> potentially allowing the US government to track the locations of employees
> of contractors of other governments, build dossiers of personal information
> for blackmail, and conduct espionage."
>
> "Facebook also reportedly censors content that the Facebook deems
> unacceptable, such as hate speech, incitement to violence, nudity, etc.
> Facebook may also be used for disinformation campaigns that benefit
> political parties, such as when Facebook was used to spread incorrect
> information on political issues and the 2019 Novel Coronavirus."
>
> Should ISOC take a position on these issues? Should other states follow the
> path opened by the US and proceed to ban Facebook, Twitter, etc?
>
> Doesn't the US position invalidate the proposals it has put forth in WTO and
> free trade agreements regarding free flow of data?
>
> More importantly, the TikTok ban is just one step of an announced US
> campaign to curtail the use of Chinese ICT products and services. I
> reproduce below statements from the US Department of State.
>
> Again, should ISOC take a position on this matter? Should states choose
> camps and decide to exclude ICTs developed or provided by vendors in other
> countries? In this context, note that US-made hardware has been known to
> contain undocumented backdoors:
>
>  
> https://www.tomshardware.com/news/cisco-backdoor-hardcoded-accounts-software
> ,37480.html  
> https://www.csoonline.com/article/2136221/cisco-confirms-undocumented-backdo
> or.html  
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-
> sa-20180328-xesc  
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-
> sa-20180307-cpcp  
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-
> sa-20180516-dnac  
> https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-
> sa-20180606-waas-snmp 
> https://blog.rapid7.com/2015/12/20/cve-2015-7755-juniper-screenos-authentica
> tion-backdoor/  
>
> Again, doesn't the US position invalidate the proposals it has put forth in
> WTO and free trade agreements regarding ICT products and services?
>
> Best,
> Richard
>
> ==========
>
> Press release at:
>
> https://www.state.gov/announcing-the-expansion-of-the-clean-network-to-safeg
> uard-americas-assets/  
>
> The Clean Network program is the Trump Administration's comprehensive
> approach to guarding our citizens' privacy and our companies' most sensitive
> information from aggressive intrusions by malign actors, such as the Chinese
> Communist Party (CCP). Today, I am announcing the launch of five new lines
> of effort to protect America's critical telecommunications and technology
> infrastructure.
>
> These programs are rooted in internationally accepted digital trust
> standards and built upon the 5G Clean Path initiative, announced on April
> 29, 2020, to secure data traveling on 5G networks into U.S. diplomatic
> facilities overseas and within the United States.
>
> The five new lines of effort for the Clean Network are as follows:
>
> *    Clean Carrier: To ensure untrusted People's Republic of China (PRC)
> carriers are not connected with U.S. telecommunications networks. Such
> companies pose a danger to U.S. national security and should not provide
> international telecommunications services to and from the United States.
>
> *    Clean Store: To remove untrusted applications from U.S. mobile app
> stores. PRC apps threaten our privacy, proliferate viruses, and spread
> propaganda and disinformation. American's most sensitive personal and
> business information must be protected on their mobile phones from
> exploitation and theft for the CCP's benefit.
>
> *    Clean Apps: To prevent untrusted PRC smartphone manufacturers from
> pre-installing -or otherwise making available for download - trusted apps on
> their apps store. Huawei, an arm of the PRC surveillance state, is trading
> on the innovations and reputations of leading U.S. and foreign companies.
> These companies should remove their apps from Huawei's app store to ensure
> they are not partnering with a human rights abuser.
>
> *    Clean Cloud: To prevent U.S. citizens' most sensitive personal
> information and our businesses' most valuable intellectual property,
> including COVID-19 vaccine research, from being stored and processed on
> cloud-based systems accessible to our foreign adversaries through companies
> such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent.
>
> *    Clean Cable: To ensure the undersea cables connecting our country to
> the global internet are not subverted for intelligence gathering by the PRC
> at hyper scale. We will also work with foreign partners to ensure that
> undersea cables around the world aren't similarly subject to compromise.
>
> Momentum for the Clean Network program is growing. More than thirty
> countries and territories are now Clean Countries, and many of the world's
> biggest telecommunications companies are Clean Telcos. All have committed to
> exclusively using trusted vendors in their Clean Networks.
>
> The United States calls on our allies and partners in government and
> industry around the world to join the growing tide to secure our data from
> the CCP's surveillance state and other malign entities. Building a Clean
> fortress around our citizens' data will ensure all of our nations' security.
>
>
> ===========
>
> Remarks by US Secretary of State Pompeo, at:
>
> https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-10/
>
>
> In April, I announced our team's Clean Path initiative to keep Americans'
> data safe from untrusted vendors. Today, I'm pleased to announce the
> expansion of the Clean Network with the launch of five new lines of effort.
> I'll walk through them quickly.
>
> First, Clean Carrier. We are working to ensure that untrusted Chinese
> telecom companies don't provide international telecommunications services
> between the United States and foreign destinations.
>
> I join Attorney General Barr, Secretary Esper, and Acting Secretary Wolf in
> urging the FCC to revoke and terminate the authorizations of China Telecom
> and three other companies providing services to and from the United States.
>
> Second, we call Clean Store. We want to see untrusted Chinese apps removed
> from U.S. app stores. President Trump has mentioned impending action on
> TikTok, and for good reason. With parent companies based in China, apps like
> TikTok, WeChat, and others are significant threats to the personal data of
> American citizens, not to mention tools for CCP [Chinese Communist Party]
> content censorship.
>
> Third, Clean Apps. We're working to prevent Huawei and other untrusted
> vendors from pre-installing or making available for download the most
> popular U.S. apps. We don't want companies to be complicit in Huawei's human
> rights abuses or the CCP's surveillance apparatus.
>
> Fourth, Clean Cloud. We're protecting Americans' most sensitive personal
> information and our businesses' most valuable intellectual property -
> including COVID vaccine research - from being accessed on cloud-based
> systems run by companies such as Alibaba, Baidu, China Mobile, China
> Telecom, and Tencent.
>
> The State Department will work closely with Commerce and other agencies to
> limit the ability of Chinese cloud service providers to collect, to store,
> and to process vast amounts of data and sensitive information here in the
> United States.
>
> Fifth and finally, Clean Cable. We're working to ensure that the CCP can't
> compromise information carried by the undersea cables that connect our
> country and others to the global internet.
>
> Huawei Marine significantly underbids other companies on multiple
> procurements to connect Asia, the Pacific, Africa, and Europe using Chinese
> state-backed underseas technology.
>
> We can't allow that to continue. We call on all freedom-loving nations and
> companies to join the Clean Network.
>
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-- 
Christian de Larrinaga 
https://firsthand.net
mu4e tool