[ih] Failures of the early Internet

[Leonard Kleinrock]

I have some data that can add to the discussion regarding early ARPANET lockups, etc. A number of them are detailed and documented in Chapter 6 of my Queueing Systems, Volume 2: Computer Applications (1975).  Among those included are: 

-Reassembly lockup
-Direct store-and-forward lockup
-Indirect store-and-forward lockup
-Christmas lockup
-Piggyback lockup
and discussions of the early ARPANET flow control protocols.
  
Assuming that this readership finds this of interest, I have scanned and attached a link for  two sections of my book (Section 6.3. FLOW CONTROL and Section 6.4. LOCKUPS, DEGRADATIONS AND TRAPS) in which these matters are detailed.  The link is https://www.icloud.com/iclouddrive/0ca-SfiMKqzY4N-egPfYRTloA#Deadlocks_etc_pp_438-451_Volume_2

Len Kleinrock
UCLA Computer Science Department
 
<Deadlocks etc pp 438-451 Volume 2.pdf>

> On Jan 19, 2024, at 6:20 PM, Jack Haverty via Internet-history <internet-history at elists.isoc.org> wrote:
> 
> On 1/19/24 16:00, Karl Auerbach via Internet-history wrote:
>> (I've never felt that I have an adequate understanding of the early routing failures and their effects.)
> 
> OK, I'll jump in.....
> 
> It was painfully easy for routing problems to occur.   All one had to do was advertise to a neighboring router that you were the best route to everywhere.   A simple bug could do the job.  Word would quickly spread, and all traffic would head your way, which sometimes made it impossible to connect to the offending router to try to fix the problem.  IIRC, something like that was what the Fuzzballs occasionally did.
> 
> Another incident I recall was also a routing issue.  I don't remember exactly where it happened, but two sites, universities IIRC, were collaborating on some research project and had a need to send data back and forth.  Their pathway to each other through the Internet was somewhat long and often congested.   So they decided to fix the problem by installing a circuit directly between their two campus' routers.
> 
> Money was of course an issue, but they found the funds to pay for a 9.6 kb/s line.  They were surprised to observe that the added line only made things worse.  File transfers took even longer than before.  Of course their change to the topology of the Internet had unexpectedly made their 9.6 line the best route for all sorts of Internet traffic unrelated to their project.
> 
> Many of the incidents I remember were caused by the routing algorithms which were based on "hops" rather than on time (as had been the case in the Arpanet for a decade or more).   This was a well-known problem which I think was part of the motivation for Dave Mills to create the NTP machinery.  In addition to routing, there were other Internet mechanisms that depended on time, but had necessarily been implemented "temporarily" until good time mechanisms were available.  For example, the TTL (Time To Live) and TOS (Type Of Service) values in IP were supposed to provide the routers with information to route IP datagrams over the most appropriate route, or quickly discard them if there was no expectation they could possibly get to their destination in time to still be useful.
> 
> Dave worked hard to get Time as an inherent element of The Internet, and our expectation was that TCP and IP software throughout the Internet would be changed to make decisions based on Time rather than Hops.   I'm not sure if that ever happened.   The Internet now knows what time it is, but does networking software today ever look at its watch?
> 
> Another incident I recall was not an Internet failure, but rather a situation where the Internet terrorized the Arpanet.
> 
> The Arpanet was touted as a "packet network", but in reality it was a virtual circuit network, using packets internally.   There were lots of mechanisms inside the Arpanet IMPs to make all user traffic travel to its destination intact and in the same order it was sent.   The network was designed to match the typical usage patterns of the era - people connected to some computer somewhere on the Arpanet, did their work, and disconnected minutes or even hours later.   Inside the Arpanet, the mechanisms to set up virtual circuits consumed resources and took time, but with sessions lasting minutes or hours the impact was tolerable.
> 
> One day the Arpanet was having problems and response times were noticeably slower than usual.  Investigation revealed that the Arpanet was flailing, constantly setting up and tearing down virtual circuits, each of which was only lasting for a second or two.   The Arpanet NOC (down the hall from my office) was in crisis.
> 
> Eventually the problem was traced down to a new release of OS software (BSD, IIRC) that had just been posted on the Arpanet, and was being installed in the large numbers of workstations (Sun, IIRC) that had started appearing on the Internet.  The new OS release included a new tool to advise its users of the current status of the Internet.  It accomplished that by "pinging" every router every few minutes to see if that router was up and responsive.
> 
> Pinging involved sending a single datagram, and receiving a single datgram in response.  But each such datagram required the Arpanet to set up a virtual circuit to carry that traffic.  With lots of OSes and lots of routers now scattered around the Arpanet, it was trying to do something it was never designed to do.   As more workstations loaded the new OS release, the problem only got worse.
> 
> Although this wasn't an "Internet failure", it was a system failure, caused by the Internet.  Administrative action suppressed the problem and as the Arpanet was decommissioned the problem disappeared.  Or perhaps moved somewhere else?
> 
> Anybody else have recollections of early failures...?
> 
> Jack Haverty
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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