[Chapter-delegates] TikTok Ban. How should ISOC respond?

Mon Dec 9 07:54:22 PST 2024

Joe and Dave,

Thank you for sharing the blogs and older information. This is very helpful
framing and contextualization in terms of additional privacy considerations
will be brought to the surface if a ban is instituted. From a security and
privacy perspective, considering the mis and dis-information spread where
the controlling party has vastly different cultural context and decisions
that result, I personally would not use Tiktok and can see the angle
brought forth to go after shutting it down. There's also the concern for
use of personal data stored and how it may be used.

ISOCs point on maintaining a free and open Internet in the May briefings
are important.

Now, I just finished grading an assignment that looks at
surveillance differences between China, US, UK, and Australia considering
the cultural and historical norms that influence vastly different outcomes
(most notably between the Five Eyes). For this discussion, the differences
with China are important to note as they will use the collected data
differently and without protections we would expect from the US, a Five Eye
nation, or any non-communist nation. People working in China believe in
the collective good and are okay with the use of their data in whatever
ways the government sees fit for what they believe is better for the
country, it's not just a tolerance, it is a complete acceptance. China also
has patterns of waiting (not attacking) unless they know they will be 100%
successful, so they are okay sitting on data for long periods of time
(Katzenstein, 1996).

Of the Five Eyes, the US is the most in favor of protecting privacy for
users. While law exists for interception (exceptional access), the view on
use of exceptional access is pushed more from Australia and UK governments.
Going back to the Obama administration, they recommended use of strong E2E
encryption for health and financial transactions. Just this week, CISA and
the FBI are now recommending Amerincans encrypt all of their traffic using
strong encryption due to US telecommunications infrastructure being
compromised by China. This revelation may change the outcomes at least
temporarily for Tiktok and should be considered in any briefing (not
necessarily addressed, but considered as it will be influencing opinions
even if not spoken).

The outcomes among the Five Eyes have varied from our differences in both
historical and cultural norms with tech and standards having a substantial
influence in the US. The Tussle in Cyberspace paper spells this out very
nicely. (I know many of you are already familiar with this work)

Caleb, thank you for the contextual considerations of the changing of
administrations as well.

I hope this is helpful and I can expand more if it is helpful. I appreciate
the step back to consider before moving forward to have the influence
intended toward the mission.

Best regards,
Kathleen

Katzenstein. The Culture of National Security. Columbia Press. 1996.
https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-culture-of-national-security/9780231104692

Clark et al. Tussle in Cyberspace: Defining Tomorrow’s Internet. 2002.
https://groups.csail.mit.edu/ana/Publications/PubPDFs/Tussle2002.pdf

On Mon, Dec 9, 2024 at 9:42 AM Dr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall via
Chapter-delegates <chapter-delegates at elists.isoc.org> wrote:

> Also, our amicus project intervened this past May in the Montana Tiktok
> case in the USA (*Alario et al, Tiktok v. Knudsen*), which was a
> state-level app ban of Tiktok aimed at app stores. I say "was" as the case
> was mooted (stopped) when the federal divestment ban law was signed.
>
> In our brief we described how this ban would undermine foundational
> aspects of the Internet and is technically unworkable. Dan York and John
> Morris published a blog post describing the case and our argument:
>
>
> https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2024/05/montanas-tiktok-ban-breaking-the-internet-and-undermining-online-privacy/
>
> And here is the PDF of the brief itself (it should be very accessible for
> a legal brief, if I do say so!):
>
>
> https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Amicus-Brief-TikTok-v.-Knudsen_05.06.24.pdf
>
>
> --
> JLH, Internet Society, hall at isoc.org ( https://josephhall.org/ )
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Chapter-delegates <chapter-delegates-bounces at elists.isoc.org> on
> behalf of Dr. Joseph Lorenzo Hall via Chapter-delegates <
> chapter-delegates at elists.isoc.org>
> *Sent:* Monday, December 9, 2024 09:07
> *To:* ISOC Chapter Delegates <chapter-delegates at elists.isoc.org>; Dave
> Burstein <daveb at dslprime.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [Chapter-delegates] TikTok Ban. How should ISOC respond?
>
>
> Hi Dave,
>
>
>
> This development is concerning, and for those legally inclined, the
> outcome from the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit on Friday was a bit
> surprising.
>
>
>
> (The Court upheld the underlying forced divestment law as constitutional,
> despite a "strict scrutiny" challenge under the First Amendment of the US
> Constitution. This was based on national security grounds, with the Court
> showing heavy deference to the government, despite the lack of public
> evidence regarding the dangers to national security.)
>
>
>
> In addition to the 2023 statement we crafted, which addresses the dangers
> of app and service bans more generally, you should know that we issued two
> strong statements in 2020 specifically regarding proposed WeChat and TikTok
> bans, as well as the somewhat innocently named US Clean Network program
> (which would have denied all interconnection in the USA with Chinese
> networks):
>
>
>
>    -
>    https://www.internetsociety.org/news/statements/2020/internet-society-u-s-administration-ban-of-tiktok-and-wechat-is-a-direct-attack-on-the-internet/
>    -
>    https://www.internetsociety.org/news/statements/2020/internet-society-statement-on-u-s-clean-network-program/
>
>
>
> We are closely monitoring the current situation in the USA, particularly
> since TikTok may appeal to the US Supreme Court. The incoming President
> appears inclined to "save" TikTok, but the details of how that will happen
> remain unclear. As the relevant ISOC leader here, think it's important to
> keep an eye on the technical implementation of any blocking order, as that
> could become complicated and is precisely where we are most concerned about
> unintended consequences.
>
>
>
> I’m not sure it’s time for another public statement (especially about a
> lower court's First Amendment ruling), given that there are still many
> legal avenues in motion, but maybe you had other ideas in mind. We would
> love to hear any ideas from Chapters and our community regarding action or
> engagement.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> Joe Hall
>
>
>
> --
>
> JLH, Internet Society, hall at isoc.org ( https://josephhall.org/ )
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* Chapter-delegates <chapter-delegates-bounces at elists.isoc.org> on
> behalf of Dave Burstein via Chapter-delegates <
> chapter-delegates at elists.isoc.org>
> *Sent:* Monday, December 9, 2024 02:28
> *To:* ISOC Chapter Delegates <chapter-delegates at elists.isoc.org>
> *Subject:* [Chapter-delegates] TikTok Ban. How should ISOC respond?
>
>
>
> 170 million Americans use TikTok, Facebook's only major international
> competitor. T*his is the largest Internet blockage in Western history.*
> The proponents—and the court—believe it is a major security problem that
> justifies blocking the Internet.
>
>
>
> (Because we have a strong, clear position on the issue - below - this note
> should have come from the Chair or CEO. But maybe it's good for the
> chapters to take the lead more often.)
>
>
>
> From the *Times: *TikTok Faces U.S. Ban After Losing Bid to Overturn New
> Law
> The law will ban the video app in the United States by Jan. 19 if its
> owner, ByteDance, does not sell it to a non-Chinese company.
> --------------------
>
> Conveniently, we have almost nothing of substance planned at Wednesday's
> board meeting. We can spend several hours discussing what ISOC's policy
> should be.
>
>
>
> ISOC took a strong position on this issue in 2023.
> https://www.internetsociety.org/news/statements/2023/specific-app-and-service-bans-are-fragmenting-the-internet/
>
>
>
>
> Is it possible for the Internet Society to take action when the problem is
> our home country?
>
> Ted, Sally - can our pr department put together a press call on zoom to
> address this openly and transparently?
>
>
>
> Here's our 2023 statement. It's very clear and to the point.
>
>
>
> Specific App and Service Bans are Fragmenting the Internet
> Increasing government actions to block or ban specific web services or
> applications are fragmenting the Internet.
>
> Because of how the Internet works, top-down interference with specific
> services and technologies on the Internet will likely damage interoperation
> and tend to splinter the Internet into smaller, less-connected islands.
>
> As the Internet and the services on it become more important, people
> increasingly depend on them. ...
>
> Some governments claim their actions are necessary for national
> security–when citizen use of some applications or services could lead to
> wide scale theft of personal data, exposure of national security assets, or
> creation of numerous in-country landing points for a widespread
> cybersecurity attack, among other risks. But the idea that these risks are
> somehow unique to a particular application or service is poorly founded:
> the same attacks could be as easily embedded in another permitted
> application. Since the Internet is such a flexible technology, any
> necessary defense of national security has to come from preventing the
> attacks *no matter how* they come from the Internet. National security
> that supposedly comes from banning a particular application is a security
> blanket made entirely of holes.
>
> Governments should avoid service or applications specific bans, which
> undermine security and access to opportunities on the world’s greatest
> communications resource. Instead of banning a particular platform or
> application based on non-technical criteria
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7754> like country of origin or
> ownership, countries should be transparent about risks and raise the
> privacy and security standards for *all* online services and app stores
> to mitigate broader potential threats to critical infrastructure and
> services from end-user devices.
>
> -----------------------
>
> (It's particularly important for the Chair to get involved. The last time
> this came up was when the chapters asked ISOC to take a position on the
> cutoff of Internet service in Gaza and the chair was asked to comment. The
> board has a fiduciary responsibility it shouldn't duck.)
>
>
>
>
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-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen
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