[Chapter-delegates] Our German colleagues on "national Internets"

Mon Nov 4 01:33:39 PST 2013

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Dear All,

The best way to protect your security is the  encryption of your
traffic.  Modern technologies provide all necessary measures for that.
And it is not necessary to provoke your neighbor or any government,
just keep your door carefully  closed.

Grigori Saghyan
ISOC.AM

On 01.11.2013 6:47, Dave Burstein wrote:
> Hans Peter Dittler of ISOC.de posted the below note, urging that 
> national security issues be kept apart from Internet routing. Many 
> engineers think this is a good way to protect the Internet. It
> certainly would be a pain in the butt to make necessary changes to
> routing tables, etc, especially in the developed world.
> 
> Others believe security is crucial and that a nation should be 
> allowed, for example, to request their packets not be sent via a
> link they believe is tapped. This was a major debate at WCIT.
> 
> My personal take is that if Egypt, for example, thinks a foreign 
> power is tapping the fiber from France to Italy - as Le Monde
> suggests is the case - it's reasonable to request the ISPs serving
> Egypt to route French-Egyptian traffic through North Africa
> instead. Renesas reported that Google switched Brazil DNS traffic
> to routing outside the country recently. I'm forwarding this to the
> list because it's important and highly controversial. In
> particular, I'd welcome comments on what would be the practical
> cost of a nation with a limited number of international gateways -
> most of the less developed world - requested their gateway 
> providers to avoid routes they believed were intercepted. My guess
> is that it would be really tough where connections are many but
> not impractical to generally do so with the typical limited
> international connections to many countries.
> 
> Network engineers out there have any answers on this.
> 
> https://www.isoc.de/
> 
> 
> Balkanization of the Internet is not a suitable concept for more 
> privacy and data security 
> <https://www.isoc.de/2013/10/balkanisierung-des-internet-kein-geeignetes-konzept-fur-mehr-datenschutz-und-datensicherheit/>
>
>  31, October 2013
> 
> On the occasion of "World Internet Day 'on 29 October declared the 
> president of the German chapter of the Internet Society ISOC.DE 
> <http://ISOC.DE>, Hanspeter Dittler to some in the political arena
> in the context of the NSA wiretapping scandal currently discussed
> proposals:
> 
> The outrage over the breach of confidentiality of data
> communications and the interception of telephone conversations by
> foreign powers is understandable. The initiated by Edward Snowden
> debate and now has become known new facts reveal how little the
> Federal Republic of Germany and other EU countries have so far
> prepared technically and organizationally on the vulnerability of
> information technology and the freedom of the citizens and the
> security of the state may be at risk. Demands for more security and
> a higher level of protection of data in telecommunications in
> general and the Internet in Germany and throughout Europe are
> therefore justified. Proposals which aim to achieve these goals,
> however, with inadequate means are, but to refuse. Especially if by
> false instruments result in only a balkanization of the Internet
> can be made to the liberty of the citizens would thus not
> protected, but the openness of the Internet through such measures
> rather vulnerable. The ultimate purpose of such a disabled 
> proposals merely symbolic politics, which can not achieve
> sustainable improvements for the people, but wants to divert
> attention from their own concept and ignorance. But this is
> rejected.
> 
> In this context ISOC.DE <http://ISOC.DE> looks especially such
> claims to be critical, you want to achieve legislation designed to
> limit the free and neutral flow of data packets on the Internet,
> for example, by an obligation to "National Routing". The idea that
> IP packets on the Internet - whether they carry e-mail, voice
> messages or other content - may no longer seek the fastest, most
> technically and economically best way themselves, but would have to
> be guided rather than national boundaries, is in fundamental
> contradiction to the fundamental principles of the Internet, for
> their maintenance and development, the Internet Society fights
> worldwide. Because the principles of openness, transparency and
> neutrality are there, due to which the Internet in its 45-year
> history could obtain its unique social and economic importance.
> Proposals that will force a re-territorialisation of the structures
> of the network and thus its "Balkanization" would, however initiate
> the end of a free Internet and so also hinder the social evolution
> of an open, free and democratic society.
> 
> In the same category in our view problematic proposals to
> providers about the operation of peering nodes should be banned
> for fall. Similarly, if the boundaries of States border Internet
> traffic thus should be limited to data processing companies from
> abroad imposes a residence requirement within the EU, the
> processing of data of EU citizens is otherwise prohibited, although
> they are in agreement. Or even private should be required to take
> measures that they can still meet against the State where they are
> established, either technically, legally.
> 
> Whether such proposals are traveling for business calculus, an
> obvious concept and helplessness in the face of progressive
> globalization or overlooking legitimate goals of data security or
> data security regulations are made, there are nevertheless
> convinced of ISOC.DE <http://ISOC.DE> disabled Instruments: They do
> not serve in the result the protection of the freedom of the people
> on the internet, but can rather, the freedom that they claim to
> protect, ultimately only restrict, if not eliminate, but without
> being able to protect the people that actually increase. In the
> current debate about undue interference of state intelligence
> services in civil liberties, but because they are mainly States to
> find a different behavior and need to be encouraged by means of
> politics and (international) law. Policy that is more concerned 
> about privacy and security of their citizens in relation to other
> States must give priority to deal politically with these
> countries.
> 
> However, it is neither the Internet in its basic structure, yet it
> is the user or other private stakeholders - not the provider of
> services or infrastructure of the Internet - the problem would be
> responsible for the actions of government services. Also, they
> would not be able to defend themselves against state action on the
> territory of a country to defend against the local law. Want to
> commit to companies and citizens on the Internet to actions that
> actually affect states and would meet only of them, from our point
> of view are therefore unsuitable means. For this reason ISOC.DE
> <http://ISOC.DE> appeals both in terms of the current negotiations
> between the parties to a future government coalition, and with a
> view to the ongoing discussions of the EU and there in particular
> the planned EU Privacy Regulation, in pursuit of legitimate goals,
> the actual effectiveness and impact carefully weigh of instruments
> in order to avoid undesirable consequences that may be relevant to
> neither the citizens nor its freedom and the Internet.
> 
> From: Hans Peter Dittler Posted in ISOC.DE
> <https://www.isoc.de/category/isoc-de/> , net neutrality
> <https://www.isoc.de/category/netzneutralitat/> , Law & Politics
> <https://www.isoc.de/category/recht-politik/>
> 
> -- Editor, Fast Net News, Net Policy News and A Wireless Cloud 
> Author with Jennie Bourne  DSL (Wiley, 2002) and Web Video: Making
> It Great, Getting It Noticed (Peachpit, 2008)
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________ As an Internet
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> 

- -- 
Grigori Saghyan
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