[Chapter-delegates] We should speak up about the disabling of autistici.org

[Christian de Larrinaga]

A DNS takedown could also be used as a trigger for instance to a terrorist
act. Or inadvertently for instance could down a critical sensor network.

For your bad actors targeted policing is needed to ensure safety as well as efficacy when
using blunt instruments such as taking down slds and higher. 

That risk and commensurate need for responsible take downs has been woefully ignored. 


C

Hank Nussbacher via Chapter-delegates <chapter-delegates at elists.isoc.org> writes:

> On 04/09/2026 13:37, Tom Fredrik Blenning via Chapter-delegates wrote:
>
> The problem with providing "x" days notice before takedown is that
> truly "bad" actors (terrorists, child pornography, etc.) should not be
> given "x" days notice to manage their migration.
>
> Regards,
> Hank
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> The availability of other domains is obviously not the problem here, nor
>> is PIR’s compliance with US law. As a US-based organization, compliance
>> is to be expected, even when the laws or orders in question may be
>> unjust. While I personally would have preferred PIR to take an
>> adversarial approach and challenge the US government in court, as for
>> instance EFF has suggested it will do, that is not the core problem I
>> have with PIR’s actions.
>>
>> My understanding of US law is limited, but as I understand it, PIR had
>> 30 days to comply. Rather than taking immediate action, a warning to A/I
>> would therefore have given them time to mitigate the worst consequences
>> of suddenly losing one of their core domains.
>>
>> A/I has several domains, and acquiring another domain is naturally not a
>> problem. But DNS is core Internet infrastructure, and abruptly
>> suspending a domain on which services depend causes real disruption.
>> Moving a website to another domain is one thing; dealing with the sudden
>> disappearance of a domain embedded throughout an organization’s
>> infrastructure is quite another.
>>
>> We cannot expect PIR not to comply with US law. But when put on notice,
>> I expect them to comply with less fervour than this: to do what the law
>> requires while making reasonable efforts to minimise collateral damage.
>>
>> For context, I am to the right of centre in most of the European
>> political spectrum. I do not particularly agree with some of the
>> communist organizations for which A/I provides infrastructure. But
>> disagreeing with them is entirely different from believing that attacks
>> on infrastructure providers serving them are acceptable.
>>
>> As the Internet Society, I think this is precisely the kind of issue we
>> should speak up about. The principle that infrastructure providers
>> should not become convenient points of leverage against lawful
>> communications and civil society is important regardless of whether we
>> agree with the people using that infrastructure.
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Tom Fredrik Blenning
>>
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-- 
Christian de Larrinaga