[Chapter-delegates] Digital Life Documentary on BBC
Chester Soong
chester at soong.net
Thu Jul 31 21:23:44 PDT 2014
*This message was transferred with a trial version of CommuniGate(r) Pro*
talking about privacy and after death, here is an interesting case with
a copyright twist. Thanks to my friend from the University of Hong Kong
on his analysis...
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/15/man-commits-suicide-blames-ex-wife-in-suicide-note-ex-wife-takes-control-of-copyright-tries-to-get-note-and-mans-other-writings-removed-from-internet/?wprss=rss_national
"Man commits suicide, blames ex-wife in suicide note; ex-wife takes
control of copyright, tries to get note (and man’s other writings)
removed from Internet
So reports Mike Masnick (TechDirt). Here’s what apparently happened:
1. Chris Mackney was involved in various bitter battles against his
ex-wife, Dina Mackney. He committed suicide and left an online suicide
note posted to his Web site, blaming Dina. (I will mostly use the
Mackneys’ first names here simply in order to avoid repetition and
confusion.) Chris had also written various other things harshly
criticizing her and others.
2. Dina Mackney got appointed administrator of Chris Mackney’s estate,
presumably because his heirs are their underage children, and she is the
guardian of the children. (I’m not a probate law expert, so I can’t
speak to the soundness of this decision by a Virginia judge, applying
Virginia law, but I will assume for the rest of the post that this
appointment was legally valid.)
3. Dina Mackney then demanded that various sites take down Chris’s
various writings, including his suicide note, on the grounds that she
represents Chris’s estate, which owns the copyright in those writings.
Why the copyright twist? Dina might have plausible claims that Chris’s
writings are libelous, or invade her or the children’s privacy, but
given the federal 47 U.S.C. § 230 statute, Web sites that host
user-posted writings are not liable for any defamation or invasions of
privacy in those writings. (Chris would have been liable for them, and
Chris’s estate might still be liable, but the sites would not be.) But
under federal copyright law, the sites that host user-posted writings
are potentially liable for copyright infringement in those writings.
Taking control of the copyrights thus makes it much likelier that the
hosting sites will indeed take down Chris’s works.
Note also that pretty much anything written down is presumptively
protected by copyright; it doesn’t matter, for instance, that Chris’s
works didn’t have a copyright notice on them, or weren’t registered at
the time they were written.
4. Some sites, however, are refusing to take down the materials, arguing
— soundly, I think — that their continued posting of the material is not
a copyright infringement. (See Marc Randazza’s letter on behalf of the A
Voice for Men site.) The main arguments are (a) fair use and (b) implied
license.
a. The fair use argument, I think, is quite strong. The sites that are
continuing to host Chris’s works aren’t deriving any material commercial
advantage from them, and their continued hosting isn’t diminishing the
commercial value of the works (which is nil). Moreover, Chris
voluntarily published the works; these aren’t personal letters that were
deliberately unpublished. As a result, I think the balance of the fair
use factors is likely to cut in favor of the fair use (even though the
site operators’ use is nontransformative, and reproduces the entirety of
Chris’s work).
The strongest precedent for Dina would be Worldwide Church of God v.
Philadelphia Church of God (9th Cir. 2000), which also involved the
suppression of a dead author’s work by successors who didn’t endorse the
work’s message. Herbert Armstrong had founded the Worldwide Church of
God, and had written “Mystery of the Ages” (MOA) (some paragraph breaks
added):
Armstrong wrote MOA, his final work, between 1984 and 1985. He completed
it when he was ninety-two years old, shortly before his death. He
copyrighted it in the name of WCG and published it in serial form in The
Plain Truth magazine, distributed free of charge to approximately eight
million people. In addition, WCG distributed over 1.24 million copies
free of charge to employees and to viewers of WCG telecasts. In all, WCG
put over nine million free copies of MOA into circulation.
Two years after Armstrong’s death, WCG decided to discontinue
distribution of MOA for several reasons, including the fact that the
Church’s positions on various doctrines such as divorce, remarriage, and
divine healing had changed. The Church hoped to “prevent a transgression
of conscience by proclaiming what the Church considered to be
ecclesiastical error” espoused in MOA and it considered that Armstrong,
who was ninety-two when he wrote MOA, conveyed outdated views that were
racist in nature. Its Advisory Council of Elders indicated that the
Church stopped distributing MOA because of “cultural standards of social
sensitivity” and to avoid racial conflict. The Council noted,
“Insensitivity in this area is contrary to the doctrinal program of WCG
to promote racial healing and reconciliation among the races.”
WCG disposed of excess inventory copies of MOA and stopped distribution,
but retained archival and research copies. WCG never sought to withdraw
or destroy personal copies or copies held by public institutions or any
public library, nor did it request that its members destroy their
copies. WCG has indicated an interest in publishing an annotated MOA
sometime in the future but has not yet begun work on it.
The Philadelphia Church of God sought to reprint MOA, but Worldwide
Church of God — as the heir of Armstrong’s copyright — sued to stop
that, and the Ninth Circuit agreed.:
The first factor calls for consideration of “the purposes and character
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes.” “The central purpose of this
investigation is to see, in Justice Story’s words, whether the new work
merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation [citations
omitted] or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new
work is `transformative.’” … PCG’s copying of WCG’s MOA in its entirety
bespeaks no “intellectual labor and judgment.” It merely “supersedes the
object” of the original MOA, to serve religious practice and education.
Although “transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding
of fair use,” where the “use is for the same intrinsic purpose as [the
copyright holder's] . . . such use seriously weakens a claimed fair use.” …
[Moreover,] MOA’s use unquestionably profits PCG by providing it at no
cost with the core text essential to its members’ religious observance,
by attracting through distribution of MOA new members who tithe ten
percent of their income to PCG, and by enabling the ministry’s growth.
During the time of PCG’s production and distribution of copies of MOA
its membership grew to some seven thousand members….
The second statutory factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” turns
on whether the work is informational or creative. While it may be viewed
as “factual” by readers who share Armstrong’s religious beliefs, the
creativity, imagination and originality embodied in MOA tilt the scale
against fair use….
The third factor directs us to consider “the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.” PCG
copied the entire MOA verbatim …. [In the Sony case,] the Supreme Court
held that reproduction of the entire work “[did] not have its ordinary
effect of militating against a finding of fair use” under the unique
circumstances of that case, to wit: copying of videotapes for
time-shifting for personal use to “enable[ ] a viewer to see such a work
which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge.” No
such circumstances exist here to justify PCG’s reproduction of the
entire work….
The fourth factor considers “the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.” … [I]t cannot be inferred
from that fact that the absence of a conventional market for a work, the
copyright to which is held by a nonprofit, effectively deprives the
holder of copyright protection…. The statute by its terms is not limited
to market effect but includes also “the effect of the use on the value
of the copyrighted work.” … “[E]ven copying for noncommercial purposes
may impair the copyright holder’s ability to obtain the rewards that
Congress intended him to have.” Those rewards need not be limited to
monetary rewards; compensation may take a variety of forms
WCG points out that those who respond to PCG’s ads are the same people
who would be interested in WCG’s planned annotated version or any future
republication of the original version. With an annotated MOA, WCG hopes
to reach out to those familiar with Armstrong’s teachings and those in
the broader Christian community. PCG’s distribution of its unauthorized
version of MOA thus harms WCG’s goodwill by diverting potential members
and contributions from WCG…. [U]ndisputed evidence shows that
individuals who received copies of MOA from PCG are present or could be
potential adherents of WCG. MOA’s value is as a marketing device; that
is how PCG uses it and both PCG and WCG are engaged in evangelizing in
the Christian community.
PCG argues that WCG’s failure to exploit MOA for ten years and its lack
of a concrete plan to publish a new version show that “MOA has no
economic value to the WCG that the PCG’s dissemination of the work would
adversely affect.” We disagree. Even an author who had disavowed any
intention to publish his work during his lifetime was entitled to
protection of his copyright, first, because the relevant consideration
was the “potential market” and, second, because he has the right to
change his mind….
I’m not sure the Ninth Circuit was correct here; but in any case, I
think that, to the extent the Ninth Circuit’s position is defensible, it
relies substantially on the commercial value of the work, both to the
copier (there, PCG, which used the work to attract adherents and their
tithes) and to the copyright owner (there, WCG, which at least plausibly
claimed that it might at some point reissue an annotated version of the
work and sell it). I don’t think this argument would prevail for
commercially valueless works such as Chris’s suicide note and other
writings, or for fundamentally noncommercial uses such as the host
sites’ continued posting of those works.
b. Sites to which Chris posted his works may also be licensed to keep
the works posted. Some sites may specifically provide in their Terms of
Use that anyone using the site gives a perpetual, irrevocable,
nonexclusive license to continue displaying whatever the user posted.
(This doesn’t block copyright claims by third parties who claim that the
user posted matters that he was never allowed to post; but it does block
copyright claims by the user himself, and by the user’s successors.)
Even in the absence of such a provision, a court might reasonably
conclude that such a license is implied by the act of posting something
(just as sending a letter to a newspaper that begins “Dear Editor”
implicitly licenses the newspaper to publish the letter, and keep the
letter up on its web site indefinitely).
c. More broadly, even sites to which Chris didn’t post the items, but
which are reposting them in order to keep the items available in the
face of Dina’s attempts to get them taken down, might well be able to
claim implied license. When someone writes and posts something that a
reasonable person would perceive as an attempt to get the widest
possible audience for his message, I think a reasonable person could
properly assume that the author is allowing others to copy it in a way
that maximizes that audience. (Even if I’m mistaken on this implied
license point, of course, such mirror sites would still be able to claim
fair use, which is one reason I started the discussion with the fair use
defense.)"
Someone I know in HK also started a business coulpe years back on
after-death service for helping to manage their "clients" online account
and privacy after death. But with HK's privacy law does not protect
privacy after death, so I am not sure how popular their services are.
Enjoy reading...
Chester
On 01/08/2014 12:45 AM, Joly MacFie wrote:
> *This message was transferred with a trial version of CommuniGate(r) Pro*
> There was a Swedish startup a few years back - MY Web Will - which
> looked to tackle the problem Appears to have gone belly up.
>
> I think the key phrase is "digital afterlife". There is a book,
> already.. http://www.yourdigitalafterlife.com/
>
> j
>
> On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 10:34 AM, Glenn McKnight
> <mcknight.glenn at gmail.com> wrote:
>> BBC Audio Documentary on Digital Life
>>
>> http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01rl5r4
>>
>>
>> ABSTRACT
>>
>> Who do you want to be able to read your old emails when you die? Are the
>> dead entitled to privacy? Jolyon Jenkins reports on the increasingly
>> contentious issue of our digital legacy.
>>
>> As we lead more of our lives online, we leave behind an ever bigger digital
>> footprint when we go. There are the public parts - the blogs, the tweets,
>> the forum posts - but also the private things such as the emails stored on
>> servers owned by companies like Google. Sorting out the digital legacy is
>> becoming as onerous as being a traditional executor.
>>
>> But it brings entirely new problems: in the case of people who have died
>> suddenly or mysteriously, relatives sometimes feel that they are entitled to
>> get access to the email accounts of dead person to try to find a clue to
>> what was happening in their lives. But many email providers resist handing
>> over this material because of a confidentiality clause in their terms and
>> conditions. Jolyon Jenkins talks to the Stassen family in Wisconsin who took
>> both Facebook and Google to court to gain access to the accounts of their
>> son Benjamin who committed suicide. He also talks to Esther in Kenya who
>> similarly would like to get into her dead sister's email account to try to
>> find a clue to her unexplained death. But unlike the Stassens, Esther has
>> had no luck.
>>
>> These are uncharted waters, where analogies with old technology quickly
>> break down, where the principles are unclear, and where important private
>> and personal matters seem to be left to the discretion of big corporations.
>>
>> Producer: Jolyon Jenkins.
>>
>> Glenn McKnight
>> mcknight.glenn at gmail.com
>> skype gmcknight
>> twitter gmcknight
>> .
>>
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>
>
>
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