[Chapter-delegates] Internet Society Appointments to theNTIA/IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group

[Miller, Stephen H (Basrah)]

I was thinking of something more like a Supreme Court: an external check on the policy and technical execution of the IANA functions (comparable to the legislative and executive branches), by consulting with the Constitution (in this parallel, something like an agreed written list of obligations and limits on the executor of the IANA functions).  Some of the execution may seem technical or "clerical", but often there are policy issues embedded in them, which can lead to unintended consequences.

This analogy may seem overly American to the many non-U.S. Chapter leaders on this list-for which, apologies-but the principle is universal and can be adapted.

-SHM


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From: Chapter-delegates [mailto:chapter-delegates-bounces at elists.isoc.org] On Behalf Of Eric Burger
Sent: Thursday, July 03, 2014 7:22 PM
To: rhill at hill-a.ch
Cc: Chapter Delegates
Subject: Re: [Chapter-delegates] Internet Society Appointments to theNTIA/IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group

Actually, I believe you are not correct in your assertion in most Western democracies. Most Western democracies have parties that select candidates that stand for election. For example, in Switzerland, different parties propose candidates for office. Correct me if I am wrong, but I do not believe the Swiss People's Party conducts a nationwide election looking for candidates.

On Jul 3, 2014, at 12:09 PM, Richard Hill <rhill at hill-a.ch<mailto:rhill at hill-a.ch>> wrote:

In democracies, the ultimate authority (parliament) is elected by all those affected, it is not chosen by a NomCom.

Best,
Richard
-----Original Message-----
From: Chapter-delegates [mailto:chapter-delegates-bounces at elists.isoc.org]On Behalf Of Eric Burger
Sent: jeudi, 3. juillet 2014 18:07
To: Chapter Delegates
Subject: Re: [Chapter-delegates] Internet Society Appointments to theNTIA/IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group
One can take this argument ab absurdum. Are outside board members not independent because they get compensation? Are independent auditors not really independent because the corporation pays the auditor's bills? Is a random lottery of individuals from around the world not really independent because their businesses rely on a domain name?

I am not necessarily defending a self-selecting board. However, I am wondering if this is not a case of "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for the alternatives"?


On Jul 3, 2014, at 11:56 AM, Miller, Stephen H (Basrah) <MillerSH at state.gov<mailto:MillerSH at state.gov>> wrote:

+1.  A little-discussed fact is that ICANN essentially selects its own Board (and so its own oversight) through NomCom and related procedures.  A general principle of effective oversight, or auditing, or corporate governance-whatever kind of oversight-is structural independence from the entity being overseen.   In the case of IANA, whatever the political or optical issues with NTIA, that separation was clear.  Going into uncharted waters with this process, it may be natural for ICANN to want to direct it and subsume it into its own organization and structure.  But well-defined outside oversight is probably the best and most efficient guarantor of accountability.  I think Evan has put his finger on the biggest danger in this process, imho.

-SHM

From: Chapter-delegates [mailto:chapter-delegates-bounces at elists.isoc.org] On Behalf Of Evan Leibovitch
Sent: Thursday, July 03, 2014 6:47 PM
To: Alejandro Pisanty
Cc: Chapter Delegates; Demi Getschko
Subject: Re: [Chapter-delegates] Internet Society Appointments to the NTIA/IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group
On 3 July 2014 05:46, Alejandro Pisanty <apisanty at gmail.com<mailto:apisanty at gmail.com>> wrote:
ISOC is the only member of the Coordination Group that is not simultaneously a directly interested party, a "client" of IANA or a structural participant in ICANN.
FWIW, I would also generally add to that set of characteristics, the people currently being considered to fill the spots on the CG by ICANN At-Large. While coming from a "structural participant in ICANN", the At-Large delegates are also non-conflicted, and seek to protect the interests of those who are neither sellers nor buyers of domains. (Indeed, such perspective of At-Large is mandated in the ICANN bylaws.)  It is no coincidence that so many ISOC chapters are also At-Large Structures.
The ALAC and ISOC delegates have highly common interest at the CG, and the potential to be an effective coalition. No doubt there will be other, self-interested coalitions with which they will need to contend.
I have already been hearing from some corners of ICANN a sentiment that oversight of IANA should "naturally" fall to those with whom ICANN has contractual relations. If carried through to its logical conclusion this perspective would, in effect, put the regulated in change of the regulator; it needs to be resisted.
Indeed, a trusted insider has suggested to me that the reference by some within ICANN to the current situation as "IANA transition" (as opposed to the more accurate "IANA stewardship transition") is deliberate, and an attempt to shift (or at least blur) the focus.
This will indeed be an interesting environment.
- Evan
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