[Chapter-delegates] Our German colleagues on "national Internets"

[Dave Burstein]

Hans Peter Dittler of ISOC.de posted the below note, urging that national
security issues be kept apart from Internet routing. Many engineers think
this is a good way to protect the Internet. It certainly would be a pain in
the butt to make necessary changes to routing tables, etc, especially in
the developed world.

   Others believe security is crucial and that a nation should be allowed,
for example, to request their packets not be sent via a link they believe
is tapped. This was a major debate at WCIT.

    My personal take is that if Egypt, for example, thinks a foreign power
is tapping the fiber from France to Italy - as Le Monde suggests is the
case - it's reasonable to request the ISPs serving Egypt to route
French-Egyptian traffic through North Africa instead. Renesas reported that
Google switched Brazil DNS traffic to routing outside the country recently.
   I'm forwarding this to the list because it's important and highly
controversial. In particular, I'd welcome comments on what would be the
practical cost of a nation with a limited number of international gateways
- most of the less developed world - requested their gateway providers to
avoid routes they believed were intercepted. My guess is that it would be
really tough where connections are many but not impractical to generally do
so with the typical limited international connections to many countries.

   Network engineers out there have any answers on this.

https://www.isoc.de/
Balkanization of the Internet is not a suitable concept for more privacy
and data security<https://www.isoc.de/2013/10/balkanisierung-des-internet-kein-geeignetes-konzept-fur-mehr-datenschutz-und-datensicherheit/>
31, October 2013

On the occasion of "World Internet Day 'on 29 October declared the
president of the German chapter of the Internet Society ISOC.DE, Hanspeter
Dittler to some in the political arena in the context of the NSA
wiretapping scandal currently discussed proposals:

The outrage over the breach of confidentiality of data communications and
the interception of telephone conversations by foreign powers is
understandable. The initiated by Edward Snowden debate and now has become
known new facts reveal how little the Federal Republic of Germany and other
EU countries have so far prepared technically and organizationally on the
vulnerability of information technology and the freedom of the citizens and
the security of the state may be at risk. Demands for more security and a
higher level of protection of data in telecommunications in general and the
Internet in Germany and throughout Europe are therefore
justified. Proposals which aim to achieve these goals, however, with
inadequate means are, but to refuse. Especially if by false instruments
result in only a balkanization of the Internet can be made to the liberty
of the citizens would thus not protected, but the openness of the Internet
through such measures rather vulnerable. The ultimate purpose of such a
disabled proposals merely symbolic politics, which can not achieve
sustainable improvements for the people, but wants to divert attention from
their own concept and ignorance. But this is rejected.

In this context ISOC.DE looks especially such claims to be critical, you
want to achieve legislation designed to limit the free and neutral flow of
data packets on the Internet, for example, by an obligation to "National
Routing". The idea that IP packets on the Internet - whether they carry
e-mail, voice messages or other content - may no longer seek the fastest,
most technically and economically best way themselves, but would have to be
guided rather than national boundaries, is in fundamental contradiction to
the fundamental principles of the Internet, for their maintenance and
development, the Internet Society fights worldwide. Because the principles
of openness, transparency and neutrality are there, due to which the
Internet in its 45-year history could obtain its unique social and economic
importance. Proposals that will force a re-territorialisation of the
structures of the network and thus its "Balkanization" would, however
initiate the end of a free Internet and so also hinder the social evolution
of an open, free and democratic society.

In the same category in our view problematic proposals to providers about
the operation of peering nodes should be banned for fall. Similarly, if the
boundaries of States border Internet traffic thus should be limited to data
processing companies from abroad imposes a residence requirement within the
EU, the processing of data of EU citizens is otherwise prohibited, although
they are in agreement. Or even private should be required to take measures
that they can still meet against the State where they are established,
either technically, legally.

Whether such proposals are traveling for business calculus, an obvious
concept and helplessness in the face of progressive globalization or
overlooking legitimate goals of data security or data security regulations
are made, there are nevertheless convinced of ISOC.DE disabled Instruments:
They do not serve in the result the protection of the freedom of the people
on the internet, but can rather, the freedom that they claim to protect,
ultimately only restrict, if not eliminate, but without being able to
protect the people that actually increase. In the current debate about
undue interference of state intelligence services in civil liberties, but
because they are mainly States to find a different behavior and need to be
encouraged by means of politics and (international) law. Policy that is
more concerned about privacy and security of their citizens in relation to
other States must give priority to deal politically with these countries.

However, it is neither the Internet in its basic structure, yet it is the
user or other private stakeholders - not the provider of services or
infrastructure of the Internet - the problem would be responsible for the
actions of government services. Also, they would not be able to defend
themselves against state action on the territory of a country to defend
against the local law. Want to commit to companies and citizens on the
Internet to actions that actually affect states and would meet only of
them, from our point of view are therefore unsuitable means. For this
reason ISOC.DE appeals both in terms of the current negotiations between
the parties to a future government coalition, and with a view to the
ongoing discussions of the EU and there in particular the planned EU
Privacy Regulation, in pursuit of legitimate goals, the actual
effectiveness and impact carefully weigh of instruments in order to avoid
undesirable consequences that may be relevant to neither the citizens nor
its freedom and the Internet.
From: Hans Peter Dittler
Posted in ISOC.DE <https://www.isoc.de/category/isoc-de/> , net
neutrality<https://www.isoc.de/category/netzneutralitat/>
 , Law & Politics <https://www.isoc.de/category/recht-politik/>

-- 
Editor, Fast Net News, Net Policy News and A Wireless Cloud
Author with Jennie Bourne  DSL (Wiley, 2002) and Web Video: Making It
Great, Getting It Noticed (Peachpit, 2008)
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