[Chapter-delegates] Our German colleagues on "national Internets"

[info at isoc.org.ec]

It's better to start our own spy and counter spy strategy. No matter what measures (tech, legal, etc) you take, You always, ALWAYS, will be a target if need to be one in the mind of your friends or enemies.

Internet Society Ecuador
www.isoc.org.ec
Síguenos @isocec

> El 01/11/2013, a las 12:49, Christian de Larrinaga <cdel at firsthand.net> escribió:
> 
> Isn't Hans Peter arguing that using legislation to filter traffic is the
> bad idea. I don't read him as saying networks should not make their own
> routing decisions?
> 
> Maybe Hans Peter can explain further himself?
> 
> At the moment most routing decisions are pretty opaque. I heard some
> complaints that UK broadband networks are playing silly games with each
> other.  We saw similar in the US over recent years. 
> 
> The Internet has an emergent architecture so every time we deploy or
> configure or filter a protocol we are shaping that architecture in
> practice. Code is law as Lessig would say ... well  so I add .. is the
> configuration file. 
> 
> C
>> Dave Burstein <mailto:daveb at dslprime.com>
>> 1 November 2013 02:47
>> Hans Peter Dittler of ISOC.de posted the below note, urging that
>> national security issues be kept apart from Int
> 
>> ernet routing. Many engineers think this is a good way to protect the
>> Internet. It certainly would be a pain in the butt to make necessary
>> changes to routing tables, etc, especially in the developed world.
>> 
>>   Others believe security is crucial and that a nation should be
>> allowed, for example, to request their packets not be sent via a link
>> they believe is tapped. This was a major debate at WCIT. 
>> 
>>    My personal take is that if Egypt, for example, thinks a foreign
>> power is tapping the fiber from France to Italy - as Le Monde suggests
>> is the case - it's reasonable to request the ISPs serving Egypt to
>> route French-Egyptian traffic through North Africa instead. Renesas
>> reported that Google switched Brazil DNS traffic to routing outside
>> the country recently. 
>>   I'm forwarding this to the list because it's important and highly
>> controversial. In particular, I'd welcome comments on what would be
>> the practical cost of a nation with a limited number of international
>> gateways - most of the less developed world - requested their gateway
>> providers to avoid routes they believed were intercepted. My guess is
>