[Chapter-delegates] Our German colleagues on "national Internets"

Carlos M. Martinez carlosmarcelomartinez at gmail.com
Fri Nov 1 09:59:33 PDT 2013


Hello,
On 11/1/13, 11:44 AM, Gary W Kenward wrote:
> It is reasonable to require ISPs to avoid routing traffic through
> territories that are known to be eavesdropping. 
>
> This is a major issue for Canada, where many ISPs route domestic
> traffic through the US simply as a cost saving measure. 
>
> The best solution is, of course, to ensure there are cost effective
> alternative routes. There is an active effort within Canada to
> implement more domestic internet exchange points.
>
> In short, traffic engineering is a viable solution.
I agree, to some point, but this is not always the case. Core-network
measures for eavesdropping will not be ever enough. Until we're
responsible managers of our data and take back responsibility for it, no
traffic routing measures will ever help you completely.

Scenario goes like this 'Oh! look country X is evesdropping, let's move
all our traffic to country Y'. Well, you have just created the right
incentives for country Y to eavesdrop on your traffic. And arguing that
there are governments that are 'more good' or 'less evil' than others is
delusional.

Best,

~Carlos
>
>
>
> On Oct 31, 2013, at 23:47, Dave Burstein <daveb at dslprime.com
> <mailto:daveb at dslprime.com>> wrote:
>
>> Hans Peter Dittler of ISOC.de <http://ISOC.de> posted the below note,
>> urging that national security issues be kept apart from Internet
>> routing. Many engineers think this is a good way to protect the
>> Internet. It certainly would be a pain in the butt to make necessary
>> changes to routing tables, etc, especially in the developed world.
>>
>>    Others believe security is crucial and that a nation should be
>> allowed, for example, to request their packets not be sent via a link
>> they believe is tapped. This was a major debate at WCIT. 
>>
>>     My personal take is that if Egypt, for example, thinks a foreign
>> power is tapping the fiber from France to Italy - as Le Monde
>> suggests is the case - it's reasonable to request the ISPs serving
>> Egypt to route French-Egyptian traffic through North Africa instead.
>> Renesas reported that Google switched Brazil DNS traffic to routing
>> outside the country recently. 
>>    I'm forwarding this to the list because it's important and highly
>> controversial. In particular, I'd welcome comments on what would be
>> the practical cost of a nation with a limited number of international
>> gateways - most of the less developed world - requested their gateway
>> providers to avoid routes they believed were intercepted. My guess is
>> that it would be really tough where connections are many but not
>> impractical to generally do so with the typical limited international
>> connections to many countries. 
>>
>>    Network engineers out there have any answers on this. 
>>
>> https://www.isoc.de/
>>
>>
>>     Balkanization of the Internet is not a suitable concept for more
>>     privacy and data security
>>     <https://www.isoc.de/2013/10/balkanisierung-des-internet-kein-geeignetes-konzept-fur-mehr-datenschutz-und-datensicherheit/>
>>
>> 31, October 2013
>>
>> On the occasion of "World Internet Day 'on 29 October declared the
>> president of the German chapter of the Internet Society ISOC.DE
>> <http://ISOC.DE>, Hanspeter Dittler to some in the political arena in
>> the context of the NSA wiretapping scandal currently discussed
>> proposals:  
>>
>> The outrage over the breach of confidentiality of data communications
>> and the interception of telephone conversations by foreign powers is
>> understandable. The initiated by Edward Snowden debate and now has
>> become known new facts reveal how little the Federal Republic of
>> Germany and other EU countries have so far prepared technically and
>> organizationally on the vulnerability of information technology and
>> the freedom of the citizens and the security of the state may be at
>> risk. Demands for more security and a higher level of protection of
>> data in telecommunications in general and the Internet in Germany and
>> throughout Europe are therefore justified. Proposals which aim to
>> achieve these goals, however, with inadequate means are, but to
>> refuse. Especially if by false instruments result in only a
>> balkanization of the Internet can be made to the liberty of the
>> citizens would thus not protected, but the openness of the Internet
>> through such measures rather vulnerable. The ultimate purpose of such
>> a disabled proposals merely symbolic politics, which can not achieve
>> sustainable improvements for the people, but wants to divert
>> attention from their own concept and ignorance. But this is rejected.
>>
>> In this context ISOC.DE <http://ISOC.DE> looks especially such claims
>> to be critical, you want to achieve legislation designed to limit the
>> free and neutral flow of data packets on the Internet, for example,
>> by an obligation to "National Routing". The idea that IP packets on
>> the Internet - whether they carry e-mail, voice messages or other
>> content - may no longer seek the fastest, most technically and
>> economically best way themselves, but would have to be guided rather
>> than national boundaries, is in fundamental contradiction to the
>> fundamental principles of the Internet, for their maintenance and
>> development, the Internet Society fights worldwide. Because the
>> principles of openness, transparency and neutrality are there, due to
>> which the Internet in its 45-year history could obtain its unique
>> social and economic importance. Proposals that will force a
>> re-territorialisation of the structures of the network and thus its
>> "Balkanization" would, however initiate the end of a free Internet
>> and so also hinder the social evolution of an open, free and
>> democratic society.
>>
>> In the same category in our view problematic proposals to providers
>> about the operation of peering nodes should be banned for
>> fall. Similarly, if the boundaries of States border Internet traffic
>> thus should be limited to data processing companies from abroad
>> imposes a residence requirement within the EU, the processing of data
>> of EU citizens is otherwise prohibited, although they are in
>> agreement. Or even private should be required to take measures that
>> they can still meet against the State where they are established,
>> either technically, legally.
>>
>> Whether such proposals are traveling for business calculus, an
>> obvious concept and helplessness in the face of progressive
>> globalization or overlooking legitimate goals of data security or
>> data security regulations are made, there are nevertheless convinced
>> of ISOC.DE <http://ISOC.DE> disabled Instruments: They do not serve
>> in the result the protection of the freedom of the people on the
>> internet, but can rather, the freedom that they claim to protect,
>> ultimately only restrict, if not eliminate, but without being able to
>> protect the people that actually increase. In the current debate
>> about undue interference of state intelligence services in civil
>> liberties, but because they are mainly States to find a different
>> behavior and need to be encouraged by means of politics and
>> (international) law. Policy that is more concerned about privacy and
>> security of their citizens in relation to other States must give
>> priority to deal politically with these countries.
>>
>> However, it is neither the Internet in its basic structure, yet it is
>> the user or other private stakeholders - not the provider of services
>> or infrastructure of the Internet - the problem would be responsible
>> for the actions of government services. Also, they would not be able
>> to defend themselves against state action on the territory of a
>> country to defend against the local law. Want to commit to companies
>> and citizens on the Internet to actions that actually affect states
>> and would meet only of them, from our point of view are therefore
>> unsuitable means. For this reason ISOC.DE <http://ISOC.DE> appeals
>> both in terms of the current negotiations between the parties to a
>> future government coalition, and with a view to the ongoing
>> discussions of the EU and there in particular the planned EU Privacy
>> Regulation, in pursuit of legitimate goals, the actual effectiveness
>> and impact carefully weigh of instruments in order to avoid
>> undesirable consequences that may be relevant to neither the citizens
>> nor its freedom and the Internet.
>>
>> From: Hans Peter Dittler 
>> Posted in ISOC.DE <https://www.isoc.de/category/isoc-de/> , net
>> neutrality <https://www.isoc.de/category/netzneutralitat/> , Law &
>> Politics <https://www.isoc.de/category/recht-politik/>
>>
>> -- 
>> Editor, Fast Net News, Net Policy News and A Wireless Cloud
>> Author with Jennie Bourne  DSL (Wiley, 2002) and Web Video: Making It
>> Great, Getting It Noticed (Peachpit, 2008)
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>
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