[Chapter-delegates] Proposed law to ban Skype in Russia?

[Grigori Saghyan]

Marcin Cieslak wrote:
> Narelle.Clark at csiro.au wrote:
>
>   
>> The principle runs to the essential features of what the Internet
>> comprises. How it works.
>>
>> [Unfortunately right now I can't find that particular RFC - STD1/RFC
>> 1600 isn't helping(!), so I would appreciate someone else pointing it
>> out. Also, if these definitions aren't as clear as my memory recalls,
>> then they darn well should be, and we should be doing something about
>> that!]
>>     
>
> Whenever I am in doubt what the Internet is, my primary reference is
> Fred Baker :)
>
> When he is not available, I usually check
>
> RFC 1122 (Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Communication Layers)
> RFC 1123 (Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application and Support)
> RFC 1812 (Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers)
>
> Those documents actually refer to further standards their clarify (like
> basic IP and TCP RFCs).
>
> But those protocol do not say how much a crippled Internet connectivity
> can be still to be called "the Internet". They describe the issue from
> the point of view of universal IP-level reachability.
>   
I thing there is also a legal problem: ITU is intergovernmental  
organization, its Recommendations are
approved by parliaments of  ITU  participating countries. RFC formally  
is not mandatory for any country because they were not issued by ITU.
In Armenia in there is special remark in the law, that our regulator is 
not regulating any numbering plan, only  ITU numbering.
>   
>> There is no technical impediment to legal intercept.
>>
>> While IP intercept isn't quite that
>> simple, the technical processes on common IP network equipment are
>> not challenging.
>>     
>
> Unless the government has a better-than-known-state-of-the-art
> cryptography, deciphering Skype traffic can be a challenge. You can
> collect all the packets but there is little you can do to get an actual
> voice payload.
>
> There are mechanisms like Perfect Forward Secrecy (although I am not
> sure if employed by Skype, it is certainly used with many SSL
> connections today) one cannot even decrypt communication that has been
> captured at some point of time. and private keys  used to secure the
> transmission have been recovered later (e.g. when authorities seize the
> computer).
>   
This is one of Russian arguments in their war against Skype